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Abstract 
In contemporary philosophy of science, the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic 
induction are regarded as the strongest arguments for and against scientific realism, 
respectively. In this paper, I construct a new argument for scientific realism which I call the 
anti-induction for scientific realism. It holds that, since past theories were false, present 
theories are true. I provide an example from the history of science to show that anti-
inductions sometimes work in science. The anti-induction for scientific realism has several 
advantages over the no-miracles argument as a positive argument for scientific realism. 
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1 Introduction 
In contemporary philosophy of science, the no-miracles argument (Putnam 1975, 73) and the 
pessimistic induction (Laudan 1977, 126; Putnam 1978, 25) are regarded as the strongest 
arguments for and against scientific realism, respectively. The no-miracles argument says 
roughly that it would be a miracle that most successful theories are completely false, so most 
successful theories are approximately true.1 The pessimistic induction says that, since past 
theories were false, it is likely that present theories are also false.2 For the past several 
decades, these two arguments dominated the debate over what epistemic attitude we should 
take towards our best theories (Worrall 1989, 101, 2011; Psillos 1996; Magnus and Callender 
2004, 322; Sankey 2017, 201). 
The aim of this paper is to defend a new argument for realism that I call the anti-
induction for realism. It asserts that, since past theories were false, present theories are true. I 
proceed as follows. In Section 2, I provide an example from the history of science to show 
that anti-inductions sometimes work in science. In Section 3, I unpack the anti-induction for 
realism, explicating how it differs from the pessimistic induction against realism, and 
displaying its several advantages over the no-miracles argument as an alternative positive 
argument for realism. I also argue that antirealists can construct an anti-induction to 
circumvent the pessimistic induction against an antirealist position. In Section 4, I reply to 
two possible objections against the anti-induction for realism. At the end, I will have 
demonstrated that the anti-induction is superior to the no-miracles argument as an argument 
for realism.  
 
2 Historical Episode 
A historical episode recounted by Carl Hempel (1966, 3–6) is useful to illustrate that anti-
inductions sometimes work in science and to highlight the opposing views of pessimists and 
anti-inductivists. A Hungarian physician, Ignaz Semmelweis (1818–1865), was appointed to 
                                           
1 I drop the qualifiers ‘most,’ ‘completely’, and ‘approximately’ from now on to save space. 
2 I drop the phrase ‘it is likely’ from now on for the sake of brevity. 
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the medical staff in the Vienna General Hospital in 1846. He was distressed to learn that 
about 10% of the women in the first maternity division died of childbed fever, while about 2% 
of the women in the second maternity division died of childbed fever. He postulated and 
painstakingly tested one by one the following six hypotheses that might account for the 
discrepancy: (i) miasmas in the air caused puerperal fever, (ii) the first division was 
overcrowded, (iii) medical students examined women roughly in the first division, (iv) the 
sight of a priest and his attendant had a terrifying psychological impact on the women in the 
first division, (v) the women in the first division delivered lying on their backs while the 
women in the second division delivered on their sides, and (vi) cadaverous materials on the 
medical students’ hands were responsible for the high mortality rate. He eliminated the first 
five hypotheses before he arrived at the sixth hypothesis. The sixth hypothesis was successful 
in dramatically reducing the high mortality rate of the first maternity division. 
Imagine that both pessimists and anti-inductivists had been watching Semmelweis as 
he was about to put the sixth hypothesis to the test. They would have made opposite 
predictions about the experimental outcome of the sixth hypothesis. Pessimists would have 
predicted that, since the five previous hypotheses failed their tests, the sixth hypothesis would 
also fail its test. By contrast, anti-inductivists would have predicted that, since the five 
hypotheses failed their tests, the sixth hypothesis would pass its test. Semmelweis performed 
the experiment of instituting a hand-washing regimen, thereby confirming the anti-
inductivists’ prediction and disconfirming the pessimists’ prediction. 
How could the pessimists and anti-inductivists draw the opposite conclusions from the 
same premise that the five previous hypotheses had failed their tests? The pessimists and anti-
inductivists operated on opposite principles. The pessimists operated on what David Hume 
(1978, 89) called the uniformity principle that an unobserved instance resembles observed 
instances. Without that principle, the pessimists’ conclusion would not follow from the 
premise. In contrast, the anti-inductivists operated on what Park (2017a, 213) calls the 
disuniformity principle that an unobserved instance differs from observed instances. Without 
that principle, the anti-inductivists’ conclusion would not follow from the premise. 
There are multiple anti-inductions, just as there are multiple pessimistic inductions.3 
Anti-inductivists run different anti-inductions in different contexts, just as pessimists run 
different pessimistic inductions in different contexts. In the context of predicting the 
experimental outcome of Semmelweis’s sixth hypothesis, anti-inductivists construct the anti-
induction that since the five previous hypotheses failed their tests, the sixth hypothesis will 
pass its test, while pessimists construct the pessimistic induction that since the five previous 
hypotheses failed their tests, the sixth hypothesis will also fail its test. In the context of 
predicting the truth-value of Semmelweis’s sixth hypothesis, anti-inductivists advance the 
anti-induction that since the first five hypotheses were false, the sixth hypothesis is true, 
while pessimists advance the pessimistic induction that since the first five hypotheses were 
false, the sixth hypothesis is also false. Anti-inductivists and pessimists formulate different 
anti-inductions and different pessimistic inductions, respectively, regarding different targets. 
The bottom line, however, is that the disuniformity principle underlies all anti-inductions, 
whereas the uniformity principle underlies all pessimistic inductions, whatever their targets 
might be. 
                                           
3 See Park (2017a) for the pessimistic inductions against scientific theories, scientists, realists, antirealist 
theories, antirealists, and pessimists. See also Park (2018a) for a pessimistic induction from the old pessimistic 
induction (Laudan 1977; Putnam 1978) to the new pessimistic induction (Stanford 2006). 
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Scientific progress requires at least occasional uses of the disuniformity principle (Park 
2017a, 216–217). Suppose that scientists underwent some trials and errors in their attempts to 
arrive at true or successful hypotheses. If they used the uniformity principle, i.e., if they were 
pessimists, they would believe that nothing follows but more and more trials and errors. By 
contrast, if they used the disuniformity principle, i.e., if they were anti-inductivists, they 
would believe that achievements follow trials and errors. If past scientists had used only the 
uniformity principle to assess the prospects of their research projects, they would have 
achieved fewer true or successful hypotheses. As a result, we might still believe that the Earth 
is at the center of the universe, and we might still use horses instead of cars and airplanes as 
means of transportation. The list of such examples can be extended ad nauseam. Scientists 
are anti-inductivists when they achieve something after a series of trials and errors, whether 
those trials and errors concern experimental outcomes or the truth-values of hypotheses. 
Hence, anti-inductions sometimes work in science. 
Pessimists might object that anti-induction is simply absurd. Suppose that anti-
inductivists and inductivists watch a stone being thrown upwards and falling down over and 
over. Anti-inductivists predict that the stone will float in the sky, and they continue to make 
false predictions. By contrast, inductivists predict that it will fall to the ground, and they 
continue to make true predictions. Thus, anti-induction is unreasonable, whereas induction is 
reasonable. We should use the uniformity principle to predict future events. 
The preceding objection, however, commits the straw-man fallacy. My position is not 
that scientists and philosophers should be anti-inductivists in all contexts, but that they should 
be anti-inductivists in some contexts and inductivists in other contexts. The fact that 
inductions work in science at some times does not refute my position that anti-inductions 
work in science at other times. 
Pessimists might now object that it was fallacious to reason that since the five previous 
hypotheses failed tests, the sixth hypothesis would pass the test. How could the failures of the 
five hypotheses be the evidence for expecting the success of the sixth hypothesis? Anti-
inductivists should have justified the disuniformity principle independently of anti-induction. 
In the absence of independent justification, it was merely epistemic luck that anti-inductivists 
made the true prediction that the sixth hypothesis would be successful. They were not entitled 
at all to make the true prediction.  
A similar objection, however, can be raised against pessimists. Imagine that 
Semmelweis was about to test the fifth hypothesis, and that pessimists predicted that it would 
fail the test because its four forerunners had failed. Their prediction was true. It was, however, 
merely epistemic luck that they made the true prediction. How could the failures of the four 
hypotheses be the evidence for expecting the failure of the fifth hypothesis? Pessimists 
should have justified the uniformity principle independently of induction. In the absence of 
independent justification, pessimists were not entitled at all to make the true prediction. 
Pessimists might now argue that my foregoing reply is straightforwardly fallacious; it 
is merely a tu quoque argument. That is, they might say that it is wrong for me to argue that 
an argument is good by saying that it is similar to a bad argument.  
Let me point out, however, that it is costly for pessimists to accuse me of committing 
the fallacy of tu quoque. The accusation implies that the pessimistic induction is fallacious. 
And if the pessimistic induction is fallacious, the strongest threat to realism evaporates. It is 
not clear whether pessimists would be willing to go this far. In my view, they would stake out 
the following new position instead. 
The new pessimist position holds that we should be anti-inductivists when predicting 
experimental outcomes, but should be pessimists when predicting truth-values of hypotheses. 
Also, scientists should keep entertaining and testing further hypotheses, despite repeated 
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failures, not with a view to finding true hypotheses, but with a view to finding successful 
hypotheses. Under this new position, pessimists could predict that Semmelweis’s sixth 
hypothesis would pass the test on the grounds that its five predecessors failed, but could also 
predict that the sixth hypothesis was false on the grounds that its five predecessors were false. 
Also, pessimists can argue that Semmelweis should have kept thinking up and testing further 
hypotheses, until he arrived at a successful hypothesis, one that would help to bring down the 
high mortality rate in the first maternity division. This new pessimist position comports with 
the fact that false theories were successful in the history of science. 
A double standard, however, is involved in this new pessimist position. Why is it that 
we should be anti-inductivists, when predicting experimental outcomes, but should be 
pessimists when predicting the truth-values of hypotheses? The new pessimist position 
contrasts with the anti-inductivist position, which is free from any double standard. It 
maintains that we should consistently use the disuniformity principle to predict both the truth-
values and experimental outcomes of hypotheses. The anti-inductivist position is better than 
the pessimist position, ceteris paribus, because the principle of economy favors the former 
over the latter. It appears that pessimists should consistently use the uniformity principle to 
predict experimental outcomes as well as truth-values of hypotheses in order to be equal to 
anti-inductivists in terms of simplicity. Alternatively, they should provide an argument to 
justify their different predictions of experimental outcomes and truth-values of hypotheses. 
Pessimists might try to justify that double standard as follows. There are infinitely 
many unconceived hypotheses that compete, for example, with Semmelweis’s sixth 
hypothesis. All of them can explain why the mortality rate of the first division was higher 
than that of the second division. Since the number of such alternatives is infinitely large, 
scientists can never reach and recognize the true hypothesis, and anti-inductivists will 
perpetually make only false predictions about the truth-values of successive hypotheses. By 
contrast, there is only a finite number of experimental failures. Therefore, we should be 
pessimists when predicting truth-values of hypotheses, but anti-inductivists when predicting 
experimental outcomes. 
The preceding suggestion, however, is problematic. If five eliminated hypotheses 
constitute an inductive rationale for thinking that there are infinitely many unconceived 
alternative hypotheses, five corresponding experimental failures also constitute an inductive 
rationale for thinking that there are infinitely many unperformed experimental failures. There 
is no reason to suppose that the former inductive rationale is stronger than the latter. If it is a 
hasty generalization to infer that there are infinitely many unperformed experimental failures 
on the basis of the five experimental failures, so is it a hasty generalization to infer that there 
are infinitely many unconceived alternative hypotheses on the basis of the five false 
hypotheses. These two inferences stand or fall together. Consequently, if pessimists predict 
that the sixth hypothesis will be false on the grounds that there are infinitely many 
unconceived alternatives, they should also predict that the sixth hypothesis will fail the 
experimental test on the grounds that there are infinitely many unperformed experimental 
failures. It follows that pessimists have no good reason to apply the uniformity principle to 
predict the truth-value of the sixth hypothesis while applying the disuniformity principle to 
predict the experimental outcome of the sixth hypothesis. The double standard remains 
unjustified. 
Pessimists might now argue that we should use the disuniformity principle when 
predicting experimental outcomes because they are ascertainable by observation, but that we 
should use the uniformity principle when predicting the truth-values of hypotheses because 
they are not ascertainable by observation. On this account, we should be anti-inductivists 
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when assessing scientists’ inferences concerning observables, but we should be pessimists 
when assessing scientists’ inferences concerning unobservables. 
The preceding argument, although tempting to pessimists, begs the question against 
anti-inductivists. It is under dispute between pessimists and anti-inductivists whether we 
should use the disuniformity principle to assess scientists’ inferences about unobservables. 
Pessimists contend that we should use the uniformity principle, while anti-inductivists 
contend that we should also use the disuniformity principle. But the pessimists’ argument 
assumes the very point under dispute in order to justify itself, i.e., pessimists state in effect 
that we should use the uniformity principle to assess scientists’ inferences about 
unobservables because the inferences are about unobservables. Such a circular argument does 
not adequately answer the question: Why should we use the uniformity principle to assess 
scientists’ inferences about unobservables? Pessimists need to justify the use of the 
uniformity principle independently of whether scientists’ inferences are about observables or 
unobservables. In the absence of such justification, we should choose the anti-inductivist 
position over the pessimist position, because the principle of economy enjoins us to do so, as 
noted above. 
 
3 The Anti-Induction for Realism and Antirealism 
Let me now turn to the pessimistic induction that, since past theories were false, present 
theories are also false. The strength of the pessimistic induction is proportional to the number 
of past theories (Park 2016, 838). The more past theories were false, the stronger the 
inductive rationale is for thinking that present theories are false. What if present theories are 
discarded in the future? The inductive rationale will become stronger for thinking that future 
theories will be false. Thus, the downfall of current theories will only reinforce pessimists’ 
conviction that future theories will be false. 
Compare the foregoing pessimistic induction with the anti-induction that, since past 
theories were false, present theories are true. As with the pessimistic induction, the strength 
of the anti-induction is proportional to the number of past theories. The more past theories 
were false, the stronger the anti-inductive rationale is for thinking that present theories are 
true. What if present theories are abandoned in the future? The anti-inductive rationale will 
become stronger for thinking that future theories will be true. Thus, the demise of present 
theories will only reinforce anti-inductivists’ belief that future theories will be true. 
As an alternative argument for realism, the anti-induction differs from the no-miracles 
argument in the following important respect. The no-miracles argument relies on inference to 
the best explanation (IBE) to justify realism, claiming that realism best explains the success 
of science. In contrast, the anti-induction does not rely on IBE. It relies instead on the history 
of science. Its premise is that past theories were false. Thus, the no-miracles argument and the 
anti-induction use radically different methods to arrive at realism.  
The anti-induction has several advantages over the no-miracles argument. First, the no-
miracles argument is subject to Larry Laudan’s (1981, 45) and Arthur Fine’s (1991, 82) 
criticism. They argue that the no-miracles argument begs the question against critics of IBE. 
The critics do not regard IBE as a reliable rule of inference, but the no-miracles argument 
uses IBE to justify realism. The critics would not be impressed by such a circular argument. 
The anti-induction, by contrast, is not susceptible to the objection of circularity because it 
relies on the history of science rather than on IBE to justify realism. 
Second, the no-miracles argument attempts to justify realism by explaining the success 
of science. Consequently, it is vulnerable to the antirealist critique that the success of science 
can be explained without invoking truth. There are nine antirealist explanations of the success 
of science in the literature (Park 2014). Proponents of the no-miracles argument bear the 
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burden of showing that the realist explanation is superior to all the antirealist alternatives. In 
contrast, anti-inductivists bear no such a burden, because the anti-induction does not attempt 
to arrive at realism by explaining the success of science. 
Third, Laudan’s (1981) list of past theories poses a threat to the no-miracles argument, 
but not to the anti-induction. The list is as follows:  
 
Laudan’s List 
- the crystalline spheres of ancient and medieval astronomy;  
- the humoral theory of medicine;  
- the effluvial theory of static electricity; 
- “catastrophist” geology, with its commitment to a universal (Noachian) deluge; 
- the phlogiston theory of chemistry; 
- the caloric theory of heat; 
- the vibratory theory of heat; 
- the vital force theories of physiology; 
- the electromagnetic aether; 
- the optical aether; 
- the theory of circular inertia; 
- theories of spontaneous generation. (Laudan 1981, 33) 
 
The past theories on this list are all counterexamples to the no-miracles argument’s 
conclusion that successful theories are true (Park 2011, 76–77). By contrast, they are the very 
fuel for the anti-inductivist conclusion that present theories are true. Without the list, the 
premise of the anti-induction that past theories were false is merely an unjustified assumption. 
Jarrett Leplin (1997) and Juha Saatsi (2009, 358) argue that the past theories on 
Laudan’s list, although successful, did not make novel predictions. Timothy Lyons (2003, 
898–899) retorts that “there have been numerous examples of novel success from theories 
that are clearly false by present lights,” providing a list of fourteen such past theories, such as 
Fresnel’s wave theory of light and Bohr’s 1913 theory of the atom. Unlike Leplin and Saatsi, 
anti-inductivists welcome Laudan’s and Lyons’s lists, taking them as the evidence for the 
premise of the anti-induction. The longer the lists, the more convincing the anti-induction is. 
The preceding discussion shows that the anti-induction departs radically from the 
traditional view that the history of science should have been stable in order for realism to be 
tenable. Under the traditional framework, selectivists make efforts to show that past science 
was more stable than pessimists depict. They distinguish between stable and unstable parts of 
a past theory, and argue that the past theories on Laudan’s list were not completely false but 
rather approximately true, on the grounds that the stable parts of the past theories are retained 
in present theories. Selectivism is embraced by many prestigious philosophers, such as John 
Worrall (1989), Philip Kitcher (1993, 140–149), Stathis Psillos (1999, Chapters 5 and 6), 
Pierre Cruse and David Papineau (2002), Patrick Enfield (2008), David Harker (2008), 
Stathis Psillos (2009), Saatsi (2009), and Peter Vickers (2017). Like pessimists, selectivists 
operate under the uniformity principle, holding that present theories will be discarded just as 
past theories were discarded (Park 2017c, 65; 2017d, 102; 2017d, 98–99; 2018b, 60–61; 
Stanford 2018, 79). Unlike both selectivists and pessimists, however, anti-inductivists operate 
under the disuniformity principle, asserting that unstable past science is the positive evidence 
for realism. 
Let me now turn to an anti-induction for antirealism. Bas van Fraassen (1985, 294) and 
K. Brad Wray (2008, 321, 2012, 376) contend that successful theories are empirically 
adequate. Mario Alai takes constructive empiricism to be claiming that “all we need to 
believe is that a theory is empirically adequate” (2017: 21). Park (2001, 78), Marc Lange 
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(2002, 282), and Lyons (2003, 898) point out, however, that the pessimistic induction, if 
correct, has a devastating consequence on the antirealist position that successful theories are 
empirically adequate. Past theories clashed with anomalies, phenomena that they could not 
accommodate. So they were empirically inadequate, although they were successful. It follows 
that present theories are also empirically inadequate, although they are successful. Thus, 
antirealists who believe successful theories are empirically adequate have every reason to 
refute the pessimistic induction. 
The antirealists can defuse the pessimistic induction by an appeal to the anti-induction 
that, since past theories were empirically inadequate, present theories are empirically 
adequate. They do not need to give up antirealism, even if it transpires that present theories 
are empirically inadequate. In such cases, the degree of their belief that future theories will be 
empirically adequate will only grow stronger, given that the anti-inductive rationale for their 
position grows stronger. Thus, the anti-induction entitles the antirealists to believe that 
present theories are empirically adequate. 
 
4 Objections and Replies 
I have claimed above that the more past theories were false, the stronger is the anti-inductive 
rationale for thinking that present theories are true. This contention, pessimists might object, 
presupposes that the number of unconceived alternatives is finite. Suppose, for example, that 
there are ten unconceived alternatives in the possibility space of alternatives, and that one of 
them is true. As scientists eliminate more and more alternatives, they get closer and closer to 
the true theory, and the probability increases that the next theory will be true. But what if the 
number of unconceived alternatives is infinite? Removing a finite number of alternatives in 
the possibility space of alternatives will in no way increase the probability of finding the true 
theory. 
     This pessimistic objection to the anti-induction, however, has a disastrous consequence 
on the pessimistic induction. As noted earlier, the pessimistic induction claims that the more 
past theories were false, the stronger the inductive rationale is for thinking that present 
theories are false. On this account, present theories are more likely to be false than past 
theories, because present theories are preceded by more false theories than past theories. If, 
however, there are infinitely many unconceived alternatives, past and present theories are all 
0% probable, and hence past theories cannot be no more probable than present theories (Park 
(2016, 840). 
Let me turn to another possible objection from pessimists. Wray (2013) explores a way 
around the realist objection (Leplin 1997, 141; Doppelt 2007, 111, 2011, 2014; Saatsi 2009, 
358; Devitt 2011, 292; Fahrbach 2011a, 2011b, 1290; Park 2011, 80; Mizrahi 2013) that 
present theories are more successful than past theories. He asks us to imagine that past 
realists, who might have existed in, say, the nineteenth century, believed their accepted 
theories merited their doxastic commitment, although their rejected theories did not, because 
the former were more successful than the latter. However, in retrospect we now know that 
past realists were wrong, i.e., that their retained theories were false, just as their discarded 
theories were false. We can extrapolate the epistemic fate of present realists from that of past 
realists. Specifically, present realists believe that present theories merit their doxastic 
commitment, although past theories did not, on the grounds that the former are more 
successful than the latter, but “our scientific offspring will look back at our theories with the 
same disdain we have for the theories of our predecessors” (Wray 2013, 4327). 
It is clear how Wray would criticize the anti-induction for realism. Imagine that past 
anti-inductivists, who might have existed in, say, the nineteenth century, believed that since 
their discarded theories were false, their retained theories were true. We now know, however, 
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that the past anti-inductivists were wrong, i.e., that their accepted theories were false, just as 
their rejected theories were false. Analogously, present anti-inductivists claim that, since past 
theories were false, present theories are true. Our descendants, however, will see in retrospect 
that present anti-inductivists are wrong, i.e., that present theories are false, just as past 
theories were false. Consequently, it does not matter whether present theories are better than 
past theories. The uniformity principle still applies, and it is wrong for anti-inductivists to say 
that since past theories were false, present theories are true. 
It is also clear, however, how present anti-inductivists would reply to the foregoing 
possible objection from Wray. Present anti-inductivists would insist that precisely because 
past anti-inductivists were wrong about their retained theories, present anti-inductivists are 
right about present theories. The more often past anti-inductivists were wrong, the more 
likely it is that present anti-inductivists are right. Thus, past anti-inductivists’ mistakes help, 
rather than hurt, the anti-inductivist position. To emphasize, it is of no use for pessimists to 
bring up past mistakes. They only stimulate the anti-inductivist spirit. 
 
5 Conclusion 
The pessimistic induction against realism holds that, since past theories were false, present 
theories are also false. In contrast, the anti-induction for realism holds that, since past theories 
were false, present theories are true. The pessimistic induction operates under the uniformity 
principle, whereas the anti-induction operates under the disuniformity principle. The anti-
induction has several advantages over the no-miracles argument as a positive argument for 
realism, the most important being that it is immune to challenges based upon the history of 
science. 
The anti-induction might still strike many readers as absurd. Let me remind them, 
however, that scientists are anti-inductivists when they eliminate unsuccessful hypotheses one 
by one in the hope that they will someday come by a successful hypothesis. You are also an 
anti-inductivist when you endure present trials and errors in your daily life in the hope that 
you will someday achieve something after the trials and errors. If you believe that failure is 
the mother of success, you are an anti-inductivist, relying on the disuniformity principle; if 
you believe that failure is the mother of more failure, you are a pessimist, relying on the 
uniformity principle. 
Finally, I do not claim that we should always be anti-inductivists. I concede that this is 
an absurd position. I insist, however, that it is also an absurd position that we should always 
be inductivists, or that we should never be anti-inductivists. Accordingly, I claim instead that 
we should at some times be anti-inductivists and should at other times be inductivists. It is a 
matter of future research to provide a philosophical account of when we should be 
inductivists and when we should be anti-inductivists. 
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